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CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE LAW
OF SLANDER AND LIBEL
JOSEPH

H.

STILLER *

A

COMMUNICATION made bona fide, upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, whether
legal or only moral and of imperfect obligation, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest
or duty, though it contains criminatory matter which,
without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable. This doctrine, announced by Lord Campbell in
Harrisonv. Bush' and defining a privileged communication as used in the law of slander and libel, while it
includes absolute privilege, may well be the point of
embarkation in the examination of the more limited subject of conditional privilege. Conditional or qualified
privilege relates more particularly to private interests,
and comprehends communications made in good faith,
without actual malice, with reasonable or probable
grounds for believing them to be true. The interest or
duty may be public, personal, or private, either legal,
judicial, political, moral, or social. Duty, as herein considered, mean "not a duty as matter of law,'but, to quote
Lord Justice Lindley's word in Stuart v. Bell,2 'a duty
recognized by English people of ordinary intelligence
and moral principle, but at the same time not a duty
enforceable by legal proceedings, whether civil or
criminal. I 1"3
The difficulty is to determine what is meant by the
term "moral duty," and whether in any given case
there is such a duty. Erle, Ch. J., in Whitely v. Adams,4
said:
Judges who have had, from time to time, to deal with questions
* Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
15 E. & B. 344, 25 L. J. Q. B. 25 (1855). See Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 47,

subd. 3 for a similar definition.
22 Q. B. 341, 7 T. L. R. 501 (1891).
3 Leon R. Yankwich, Essays in the Law of Libel (Los Angeles, California:
Parker, Stone & Baird Co., 1929), p. 150.
4 15 C. B. N. S. 392 (1863).
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as to whether the occasion justified the speaking or the writing
of dafamatory matter, have all felt great difficulty in defining
what kind of social or moral duty, or what amount of interest
will afford a justification.
5
The definition in Bailey v. City of Philadelphia
perhaps
as closely defines the concept as possible:
A moral obligation in law is defined as one which cannot be
enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who
incurs it, in conscience and according to natural justice, and
is otherwise defined as a duty which would be enforceable by
law, were it not for some positive rule which, with a view to
general benefit, exempts the party in that particular instance
from legal liability.
The exercise of the privilege is, moreover, curtailed
by the corresponding moral duty which "every one owes
.. . not, as a volunteer in a matter in which he has no
legal duty or personal interest, to defame another unless he can find a justification in some pressing
emergency. "1
One may not go about in the community and, acting upon mere
rumors, proclaim to everybody the supposed frailties or bad
character of his neighbor, however firmly he may believe such
rumors, and be convinced that he owes a social duty to give
them currency that the victim of them may be avoided. 7
One of the earliest cases of qualified privilege is
8
Parson Prit'sCase.
Although the report of this case is very short, it will be perfectly understood by a reference to Fox's "Martyrology,"
where the author, in giving an account of the severe punishments inflicted by the vengeance of Heaven upon some of the
persecutors of the Protestants during the reign of the Bloody
Mary [1553-58], states that Grimwood or Greenwood, as he is
called by Rolle, one of the perjured witnesses who was hired
to swear away the life of John Cooper, an innocent person, who
was convicted and hanged, was soon after destroyed by the terrible judgment of God, being suddenly seized while in perfect
5 167 Pa. 569, 31 A. 925 (1895).
6 Coxhead v. Richards, 2 M. G. & S. 569, 15 L. J. C. P. 278 (1846).
7 Byam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888).
8 1 Roll. Abr. 87, pl. 5.
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health, so violently that his bowel gushed out. From the report
it appears that the defendant, Parson Prit, having been recently settled in the parish, and not knowing all his parishioners, in preaching against the heinous sin of perjury, cited
this case from the "Book of Martyrs"; and no doubt commented severely upon Greenwood, and upon White, his forsworn
companion, who by their perjury had accused an innocent man
to be drawn in quarters and his wife and children to be left
desolate. It turned out, however, that Greenwood was not
dead, and that, being a resident of that parish, he was present
in the church and heard the sermon, and afterwards brought
a suit against the parson for charging him with perjury. But
the court held that it was a privileged communication, and the

circumstances under which the words were spoken showed there
was no actual malice towards the plaintiff.9
The decision is probably not law today, but it is enlightening for its recognition, at an early date, of this concept.
The discussion of moral obligation proper may be
divided into four general groups, into which the subject
matter of the various cases loosely falls:
1. Those obligations arising out of the family relation, with particular reference to complications occurring
through the presence of a suitor for the hand of a member of such family.
2. Moral obligations in the employer-employee relationship, especially the consideration of furnishing a
recommendation or reference upon the termination of
employment.
3. Those duties giving rise to the privilege because
of a common membership in a church, or fraternal or
social order.
4. Certain miscellaneous moral interests based on a
common interest in the subject matter, recognized as
compulsory extra-judicially.
FAMILY RELATIONSHIP

It may be stated as a general proposition that a communication, untrue and otherwise defamatory, made by
9Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. (N. Y.)

410 (1839).
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a close relative of a person wooed concerning the char-

acter of his or her suitor, whether in response to a request or not, if made without malice and from good

motives, in the belief of its truth, will be held to be conditionally privileged. 10
The right of a parent to investigate the character and
reputation of his daughter's fianc6 and to divulge to her
the results of such investigation has been repeatedly
upheld.1 As a natural extension of the doctrine, the
statement or report to the parent of one hired 12by him to
make such investigation is likewise privileged.
Other close family relations permit the same liberty.
Thus, in Todd v. Hawkins,3 a widow, being about to

marry the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant, her son-in-law, impugning the plaintiff's character,
but the communication was held to be non-libelous on

account of the near relationship."
Outside the family relation, there is some authority
to indicate that friendship will sufficiently excuse the
communication, provided that it be preceded by a request." But mere friendship, no matter how close, will
not excuse a voluntary communication of this character.
A leading case involving this proposition is Byam v.
Collins." In this case, the plaintiff was a lawyer in
Caledonia, where he had practiced for several months.
' 0 Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N. E. 197 (1903).
11Martin L. Newell, Slander and Libel (3rd ed., Chicago: Callaghan &
Co., 1914), p. 578, sec. 568 f.; W. Blake Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed.,
London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1929), p. 217, and cases there cited; Baysset
v. Hire, 49 La. Ann. 904, 22 So. 44 (1897), holding a statement made by a
father to friends of the suitor to be conditionally privileged. But see Peterson
v. Rasmussen, 47 Cal. App. 694, 191 P. 30 (1920), where the defendant, the
mother of the plaintiff's fiancg, wrote to the plaintiff's friends a libelous letter
which was held not to be privileged, as not in response to their request.
(Quaere: Should a request from friends of the person impugned raise the
privilege?)
12 Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177 (1876).
13 8 Car. & P. 89, 56 R. R. 834 (1837).
14 See also McBride v. Ledoux, 111 La. 398, 35 So. 615 (1904) ; Sunderland
v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188, 7 Am. Rep. 322 (1871).
15 Buisson v. Huard, 106 La. 768, 31 So. 293 (1901) ; Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis.
321, 48 N. W. 555 (1891)-Statement made to third person acting on behalf
of father in response to inquiry held to be privileged.
16111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888).

CONDITIONAL

PRIVILEGE IN SLANDER AND LIBEL

The defendant, Mrs. Collins, and one Dora McNaughton,
with whom the plaintiff was on terms of social intimacy,
and whom he subsequently married, also lived there.
The two women had been intimate friends, and for some
time before she had met the plaintiff Dora had repeatedly requested the defendant that if she "knew anything
about any young man she went with . . . to tell her,
because her father did not go out a great deal and had
no means of knowing, and people would not be apt to
tell him," while Mrs. Collins' brother would be apt to
know. Prior to the defendant's writing the defamatory
letter they became estranged. Dora's request had been
made four years before the date of the letter. Under
the facts, it seems that Dora did not at the time want
any information from the defendant and the latter knew
it, although she wrote that the letter was prompted by
the defendant's friendship and the solicitation of mutual
friends.
In holding that the defendant was a mere volunteer,
and giving the plaintiff judgment, the court said:
Mrs. Collins was not related to her and was under no duty to
give the information .... She could properly tell what she knew
about young men, but could not defame them, even upon request,
by telling what she did not know, what nobody knew, but what
she believed upon mere rumors and hearsay to be true. The
mere fact that she was requested or even urged to give the
information did not make the defamatory communication
privileged.
Krebs v. Oliver 17 places more emphasis upon the importance of a preceding request. Here, statements that
a man had been imprisoned for larceny, made to the
family of a woman he was about to marry, by one not
a relative of either and not in answer to an inquiry, were
held not privileged. Extending this doctrine, "The Count
Joannes" v. Bennett 8 presented the case of a letter being
written to a woman containing libelous matter concerning her suitor, written by one who was her friend and
778 Mass. 239 (1858).
1887 Mass. 169 (1862).
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former pastor; and at the request of the addressee's parents, who assented to all its contents. The circumstances
were held to be insufficient to justify the communication. 9
To consider briefly other aspects of the family-relation
privilege, the old case of Solet v. Solet 20 presents the principle that a father who accuses his daughter of imfamous
conduct will be held blameless because of the relationship, and the language which, applied to any other person, might be considered malicious will under such circumstances be ascribed rather to a sense of duty. The
case of Lehmann v. Medack21 permits the privilege to be
invoked as to statements concerning the character of an
unmarried daughter made to her mother in response to
the mother's inquiries. A voluntary remark, however, is
actionable.22
The fact that the suitor becomes the husband does not
2
seem to remove the privilege. In Atwill v. Mackintosh,
a third person, at the request of the wife's father, wrote
a letter concerning the husband's general standing in
the community and was allowed to claim his privilege in
a suit by the husband.
Although it is usually considered as a problem in domestic relations, the right of a parent to advise a son
or daughter to leave his or her spouse should be noted
here, as to those situations wherein the statements made
by the parent to induce the separation are allegedly
libelous. While the actions against the parent-in-law are
usually not based on defamation, a parent who from improper motives induces a daughter to leave her husband
or a son to leave his wife may be liable to the husband
or wife for enticing away the spouse. 2 But good motives
19Harriott v. Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585, 44 N. E. 992 (1896), holds the
privilege arises because the statement was made during a conversation between
interested persons, not relatives.
20 40 La. 339 (1842).
21 152 S. W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App., 1913).
22 Richmond v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 435, 126 S. W. 596 (1910).
23 120 Mass. 177 (1876).
24 Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N. W. 202 (1894) ; Multer v. Knibbs, 193
Mass. 556, 79 N. E. 762 (1907); Ickes v. Ickes, 237 Pa. St. 582, 85 A. 885
(1912) ; Jones v. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N. W. 179 (1909).
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and a reasonable belief in the necessity for such conduct will excuse the parent, if the action is not accompanied by recklessness or a lack of proper investigation;
although a stranger would be liable under similar circumstances. 25 However, the conduct of the parent will
be liberally construed and worthy motives presumed.26
As might be expected, statements made to one spouse
about the other by a non-relative rarely are privileged.
The court, in Watt v. Longsdon,5 stated that a friend of
the wife could not necessarily be said to be under such
a social or moral duty as to render privileged his disclosure of a report, honestly believed by him, that the
husband was guilty of gross immorality.
Whether he is under such a duty depends upon the circumstances of the case, the nature of the information, and the relation of speaker and recipient, always bearing in mind that as
a general rule it is not desirable to interfere in the affairs of
29
man and wife.
And the language in Burton v. Mattson" leaves no room
for argument:
It is apparent from the pleadings that these unsolicited communications were made by the defendants merely on the assumption that the wife of the plaintiff would regard it as a
friendly act on their part [to tell the wife of the husband's
alleged infidelities]. Any legal excuse or moral duty the defendants may have had in writing the letters complained of
certainly does not appear from the express allegations of the
complaint itself, nor can any such duty or excuse be reasonably
inferred therefrom.
On principle, one would expect that a prior request of
the addressee might raise the privilege in favor of the
communicant; and so it is held in some cases, notably
McDonald v. State.31 But the decisions are far from uni25 Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638 (1893) ; Tucker v. Tucker,
74 Miss. 93, 19 So. 955 (1896); Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep.
7912 6 (1884).
Burnett v. Burkhead, 21 Ark. 77, 76 Am. Dec. 358 (1860).
27 Beals v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 405, 21 N. E. 959 (1889).
28 [1930] 1 K. B. 130, 69 A. L. R. 1005.
29 See also Wenman v. Ash, 13 C. B. 836, 138 Eng. Rep. 1432 (1853).
3050 Utah 133, 166 P. 979 (1917).
31 73 Tex. Crim. 125, 164 S. W. 831 (1914).
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form, and the case just cited is directly controverted by
Driessel v. Urkart.3 2 And a somewhat analogous situation, wherein a husband makes a defamatory statement
concerning his own wife to a third person, has also been
held culpable. 38 So, too, in Davis v. State, 4 there was
no privilege where the father of one who abandoned his
wife told the latter's father, when questioned as to the
cause of the separation, that the wife had been unchaste.
Another group of cases should be mentioned: those
based upon the privilege of a communication to a parent
concerning his child made in response to inquiry. The
principles are not controverted, and may be summed up
in a quotation from the opinion in Long v. Peters:
The mother had an interest in the matter, and a right to
know the truth of reports charging her minor daughter with
an offense, or improper conduct. The defendant, having the
information within his knowledge which was sought by the
mother, and being interested in the matter, had a right to
impart that information in response to the mother's solicitation....
It would be the part of a good neighbor and a good
citizen . . . to aid parents in reaching a true knowledge of the
conduct of their children. 85
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSMIP

A consideration of the second general subdivision of
the subject will emphasize the situation arising upon an
employer's furnishing an unfavorable recommendation
or retracting a favorable one. An employer is under no
legal obligation to furnish a former employee with a
letter of reference ;6 but he does seem to have a moral
responsibility to reply to the inquiries of a proposed employer and will not be held liable for defamatory state,32 147 Wis. 154, 132 N. W. 894 (1911).

83 Stayton v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 205, 78 S. W. 1071 (1904). See also
Vanloon v. Vanloon, 150 Mo. App. 255, 140 S. W. 631 (1911).
34 74 Tex. Crim. 298, 167 S. W. 1108 (1915).
3547 Iowa 239 (1877). See also Moore v. Butler, 48 N. H. 161 (1868);
Livingston v. Bradford, 115 Mich. 140, 73 N. W. 135 (1887).
36 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 174
Ill. 398, 51 N. E. 811 (1898); New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co.
v. Schaffer, 65 Ohio St. 414, 62 N. E. 1036 (1902).
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ments, if made without malice and in good faith.17
As to the nature of the reference furnished, in Doane
v. Grew38 is made this general statement, which is subject
to some limitations:
Where the former employer of a domestic servant answers
inquiries from prospective employers in regard to the character and capabilities of such former servant, he does not perform his whole duty to the inquirer if he confines himself to
facts of which he has personal knowledge, or to giving information which he had investigated fully, and it is his duty to
impart any material information that he has received, even if
he has not attempted to investigate it at all, and he cannot
be held liable in an action for slander for performing this
duty in good faith; and if he ought not to have believed the
reported fact or was reckless or careless in believing it, this
does not make him liable for giving in good faith the information that the needs of the privileged occasion called for.3 9
Child v. Affleck, 40 decided by the King's Bench in
1829, presented an early application of this doctrine.
The plaintiff, having produced a good character before
being hired, had been in the defendant's service. After
a few months, the plaintiff was hired by another, who
wrote to the defendant for a reference, and received this
allegedly libelous reply:
Mrs. A.'s compliments to Mrs. S., and is sorry that in reply
to her inquiries respecting E. Child nothing can be in justice
said in her favour. She lived with Mrs. A. but for a few
weeks, in which short time she frequently conducted herself disgracefully; and Mrs. A. is concerned to add she has, since her
dismissal, been credibly informed she has been and now is a
prostitute in Bury.
The defendant also went to the new employer, and to
the plaintiff's former employer and made similar statements. The plaintiff lost her position. She contended
that the malice necessary to remove the prima facie
37 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N. E. 1003 (1904) ; Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Medley, 55 Okla. 145, 155 P. 211 (1916) ;
Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A., N. Y., 1933).
38220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620 (1915).
39 Cf. Day v. Chamber of Commerce of U. S., 267 N. Y. S. 215 (1933).
40 9 B. & C. 403, 109 Eng. Rep. 150 (1829).
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claim of privilege based on moral obligation was shown
by statements as to the plintiff's conduct after she had
left the defendant's service and also by the statements
made to third parties without inquiry. Parke, J., in
holding for the defendant, stated that express malice
was necessary to be shown, and approved the rule laid
down by Lord Mansfield in Edmondson v. Stephenson"
that, in an action for defamation in giving a servant's
character, "the gist of it must be malice, which is not
implied from the occasion of speaking, but should be
42
directly proved."
This doctrine has been consistently reiterated-with
modern decisions gradually allowing proof of implied malice 8 --and has become engrafted with several variations,
chief of which is the qualification allowing an employer
who has given a recommendation to retract it thereafter
upon learning what he believes to be evidence in derogation of the recommendation already given. Although
at least one case holds that a recommendation addressed
to the public generally "if untrue would have exposed
the writer to an action by any one injured thereby,"4 the
legal merit of this statement is doubtful.4 5 However, the
case is valuable as indicating the circumstances under
which the refinement just mentioned arises. The facts
are these:
A few days after the plaintiff left the defendant's employ, the defendant directed a letter to be written to a
third person, stating that since Fowles' departure, the
defendant had heard of his taking several trunks with
him, larger than required for his clothing, and requestBull. N. P. 8 (1766).
See also Bacon v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 55 Mich. 224, 21 N. W.
324 (1884). As to implied malice, see Sunley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 132 Iowa 123, 109 N. W. 463 (1906). In Fountain v. Boodle, 3 Q. B. 11
(1842), plaintiff servant obtained judgment upon proof that defendant's statement was knowingly falsified. And see Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578 (1828).
43 Carroll v. Owen, 178 Mich. 551, 146 N. W. 168 (1914); Chipley v.
Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934 (1887); Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa 488,
75 N. W. 355 (1898); Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 863, 13 So. 203 (1893);
Tremble v. Morrish, 152 Mich. 624, 116 N. W. 451 (1908).
44 Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20 (1864).
45 But see, apparently in accord, Gardner v. Slade, 13 Q. B. 796, 18 L. J.
Q. B. 334 (1849).
41
42
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ing that an officer watch him and examine his baggage.
Thereafter, the plaintiff's new employer visited the defendant's store, and the latter said he desired to set
him right in regard to Fowles; that he had become such
a notorious liar that he could place little or no confidence in him; that he had strong cause to doubt his
honesty and had written to have an officer employed to
watch him. It does not appear that the plaintiff suffered
special damage. The court dismissed the suit, stating:
After a mercantile firm has given to one of its clerks a general
recommendation as such, if a partner is led by facts subsequently coming to his knowledge to change his opinion, it is
his right and duty to communicate the facts to a subsequent
employer of the clerk, in order to guard him against being
misled by the previous recommendation of the firm.
To the same effect is Butterworth v. Conrow.46 There a
former employer was held entitled to write the person
with whom employment was obtained on the strength of
his recommendation that he was mistaken in the honesty
of the person recommended.
Turning from the consideration of references, to statements made by third persons to an employer concerning
the character of an employee, one finds the same demarcation observed in the discussion of third persons
and the family-relation privilege. Again, it appears that
a preceding request by the employer will excuse the
libelous statement, unless malice, express or implied,
exists to destroy the privilege. 47 And in the reverse situation, that is, where the employer makes derogatory
statements concerning the employee to a third person,
the existence of a preceding request by the employee, or
the presence of a family relationship between employee
and third party is sufficient excuse. 8 Of course, the priv46 15 Del. 361, 41 A. 84 (1895).
47 Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So. 908 (1910); Zaucha v. Smolinsky,
207 IMI.App. 158 (1918) ; Hart v. Reed, 40 Ky. 166, 35 Am. Dec. 179 (1840).
Cf. Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N. E. 91 (1885), where defendant's
non-malicious motive rendered the communication not privileged.
48 Christopher v. Aken, 214 Mass. 332, 101 N. E. 971 (1913); McCarthy v.
Lambley, 46 N. Y. S. 792, 20 App. Div. 264 (1897) ; Rosenbaum v. Roche, 46
Tex. Civ. App. 237, 101 S. W. 1164 (1907); Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Buchanan, 248 S. W. 68 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923).
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ilege must not be abused, and the extent of the publication is in some instances controlling as to whether the
statement is malicious or not. But each case must stand
on its own merits. Thus, in Hunt v. GreatNorthern Railway Company,4 9 the defendant company's publication in
a circular distributed to its employees why one of them
had been dismissed was held privileged. But, a notice
posted on a bulletin board that the plaintiff had been discharged for drinking, was held actionable in Louisville
Taxicab and Transfer Company v. Ingle.50 However, the
case of Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Richmond5 1 is responsible for the ruling that if a railway company has
reason to believe that a discharged employee, seeking an
important position in the railway service, is incompetent,
careless, or otherwise unfit, it is obligated to communicate its knowledge or belief to all who are likely to
employ him in such service, and if the communication is
published in good faith, it is privileged.
As would be expected, a communication to the plaintiff's employer in answer to an inquiry is not privileged
where the inquiry was provoked by the defendant to
afford an opportunity to make a libelous statement.52
A distinctive feature of this sub-topic is that the necessity for a request is precluded by the existence of a public employment in which the employee is engaged at the
time of the making of the defamatory statement. Especially with reference to transportation agencies is this
situation presented, and complaints of passengers are
frequently within this category. Thus, the court, in Doyle
v. Clauss,53 held privileged a letter written to a railroad
company stating that a ticket agent "seemed to do all
she could to delay passengers waiting for tickets, and
that four men threw in their nickels and ran downstairs
without passing through the turnstile," and intimating
492 Q. B. 189, 60 L. J. Q. B. 498 (1891).

50229 Ky. 578, 17 S. W. (2d) 709 (1929).
5173 Tex. 568, 11 S. W. 555 (1889).
52 Draper v. Hellman Comm. Trust & Savings Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 263 P. 240
(1928).
53 190 App. Div. 838, 180 N. Y. S. 671 (1920).
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that she doubtlessly kept such money. And in Adams v.
Cameron" a letter charging the plaintiff railroad conductor with coarse deportment to passengers while under
the influence of liquor was held blameless. 5
Also, especially with reference to railroads, statements
made during the course of an investigation of the conduct of the employee are privileged.5" An interesting
refinement of the doctrine just stated appears in Polk
v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company. 7 Under the terms
of a contract of employment between the railway brotherhood, of which the plaintiff was a member, and the
railroad company employing the plaintiff, the latter was
called into conference with the road superintendent to
investigate the reason for the discharge of a member of
the plaintiff's section crew. The superintendent said to
the plaintiff in the hearing of brotherhood representatives that unless the plaintiff reimbursed the company
for time out of which he had defrauded it, he would be
criminally prosecuted. Although the plaintiff was not
himself the subject of the investigation, the remark was
nevertheless held qualifiedly privileged, because made on
a privileged occasion. The decision does indicate that
the statement was relevant, however, as the investigation
developed into a trial of the plaintiff as well, but it goes
far to allow the privilege.
The court nowhere in its opinion refers to "moral obligation" as such, but bases its argument upon the concept
of qualified privilege in a common subject matter. However, the obligation of an employee or servant, in the
performance of his duties, not to be satisfied with a bare
5427 Cal. App. 625, 150 P. 1005 (1915), rehearing denied, 27 Cal. App.
625, 151 P. 286.
55 Cf. Haney v. Trost, 34 La. Ann. 1146, 44 Am. Rep. 461 (1882), wherein
defendant's wife, a stockholder in a street railway company, informed her husband that she had heard persons boast that a car of the company, driven by
plaintiff, was a good "dead-head car" for them, and defendant informed the
foreman of the company, who dismissed plaintiff without investigation. Held,
not slanderous.
56 Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925),
where statement by superintendent was made to ticket agent that plaintiff
conductor was not punching tickets and turning them in, but giving them to
the agent to be resold.
57 156 Ark. 84, 245 S. W. 186 (1922).
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execution of his trust, but to exert his every effort in
his employer's behalf, clearly partakes of that idea of
58
moral duty heretofore defined.
COMMON MEMBERSHIP

A third general classification, that of a common membership in a religious, fraternal, or social organization
as excusing a defamatory communication, is predicated
upon the theory formulated in Holmes v. Royal Fraternal Union, 9 that "the member by accepting membership voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the society so long as it acts within its authority," so
as to render privileged statements made by such society
or its authorized agents in that behalf in the course of
an investigation of the conduct or character of an officer
or member. 60 However, the privilege is not so far reaching as in the employer-employee relation. Thus, the
excuse of the defendant in Holmes v. Johnson61 that his
statement, made to fellow-members of a lodge that the
plaintiff, also a member, was a thief, was justified as in
the exercise of a duty to keep the lodge pure, was held
insufficient to discharge him from liability.2 In Illinois,
in Szimkus v. Ragauckas,68 it was held improper for
officers of a society to carry out its resolution to publish
a libelous article concerning one of the members. 64
The case of Graham v. State6 5 is authority for the
58 In Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Tolbert, 46 S. W. (2d) 361 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1932), a roadmaster's volunteered statement to superiors that a
section boss was throwing dice on the company's time was held not privileged,

and the
59222
6oCf.
analogy

railroad was liable in slander.
Mo. 556, 121 S. W. 100 (1909).
Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 105 (1853), which refers to the
between lodge and church membership in this connection.

6133 N. C. 55 (1850).

62 And where the purpose of the publication was merely to ridicule, the
privilege was held violated. Del Ponte v. Societa Italiana di M. S. Guglielmo
Marconi, 27 R. I. 1, 60 A. 237 (1905).
68 189 III. App. 407 (1915).
64 But a report in a lodge pamphlet is prima facie privileged. Kirkpatrick v.
Eagle Lodge No. 32, 26 Kan. 384 (1887). And see Hayden v. Hasbrouck, 34
R. I. 556, 84 A. 1087 (1912); Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 479
(1856).
65 6 Ga. App. 436, 65 S. E. 167 (1909).
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statement that communications made to a secret
fraternal benevolent society are privileged if made either
pending an investigation into an alleged violation of its
by-laws by a member or in good faith to bring about
an investigation and trial. In Berot v. Porte," the defendant was held morally obligated, and therefore blameless, in stating, when summoned before a fraternal investigating committee, that 67the plaintiff had negro blood,
although he was mistaken.
McKnight v. Hasbrouck,6s a strong case in point,
clearly stresses the moral obligation in such relationships. Here a letter was written to the secretary of a
medical society by a delegate, who was also a member,
protesting against the election of the plaintiff to honorary membership in the society. 9 The court held it to
be the bona fide discharge of a duty imposed on him to
inform the society of all matters and things relating to
the medical profession which in his judgment seemed
necessary to maintain the honor and dignity thereof,
and therefore privileged. The decision also holds that
it was not a part of the defendant's prima facie defense
to allege0 affirmatively that he believed the statements to
7
be true.
66 144 La. 805, 81 So. 323 (1919).
67 However, in Nix v. Caldwell, 81 Ky. 293, 50 Am. Rep. 163 (1883),
defendant was held liable because not a member. And see Bayliss v. Grand
Lodge, 131 La. 579, 59 So. 996 (1912).
68 17 R. I. 70, 20 A. 95 (1890).
69 The letter itself is most interesting. Speaking of the plaintiff, it says, in
part: "At his best he was but a blow-hard ....
Some few years ago he ran a
third rate hotel for a while, but he went to smash there ....
He . .. endorsed
one of the most arrant quacks . . . and of late he has been going about
selling some kind of plasters. . . He . . . has long since prostituted all his
former claims on the profession. I assure you that I do not write this from
any ill-feeling toward him, as we hold the pleasantest social relations whenever
we meet."
70 The publication in a medical journal of plaintiff's discharge on account of
professional misconduct was held privileged in Allbutt v. General Council of
Medical Education, 23 Q. B. D. 400, 58 L. J. Q. B. 606 (1889). Letter to a
member of an association of ministers, containing libelous matter about another
minister, written by a non-member minister, was held not privileged in
Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293, 39 Am. Rep. 454 (1881). There is, of
course, no privilege where the power to discipline does not exist. Hocks v.
Sprangers, 113 Wis. 123, 87 N. W. 1101, 89 N. W. 113 (1901-2); Lovejoy v.
Whitcomb, 174 Mass. 586, 55 N. E. 322 (1899).
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Churches have long been held to possess a spiritual
dictatorship over their congregations, and it is not surprising that the courts have recognized the privilege of
an officer of the church, or a member, under proper circumstances, to make defamatory statements as to the
character of a supposed strayer from the path of righteousness. 7 ' But the pastor's derogatory statement, to be
privileged, must be made while presiding at a meeting
of the congregation while matters concerning a member's
conduct are under inquiry, that is, during disciplinary
72
proceedings, and not during ordinary church services,
or in aiding the church board to determine whether it
should accept a member's resignation. 7 And a member's
statement is similarly limited. 74
Kersting v. White75 seems contrary to the general
trend of decisions in holding privileged slanderous gossip between two members of a church. However, the
court's statement of the rule is sound:
The defendant was a member of a religious society and as such
owed the moral duty to aid in purging it of immoral or unworthy members, and to such end to communicate to it any
information he honestly believed to be true, showing immoral
conduct by a member.
Carter v. Papineau71 reveals that the alleged defamation may be implied. The rules of the church of which
the defendant was a clergyman permitted the refusal
of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper to evildoers or
those who had wronged a neighbor, and the defendant,
when administering the rite, passed the plaintiff com71 Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 49 Am. Rep. 239 (1883); Kersting v.
White, 107 Mo. App. 265, 80 S. W. 730 (1904); Anderson v. Malm, 198 Ill.
App. 58 (1916) ; Everett v. De Long, 144 Ill. App. 496 (1908).
72 Anderson v. Malm, 198 Ill. App. 58 (1916); Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn.
23, 81 A. 1013 (1911).
73 Everett v. De Long, 144 MI1.App. 496 (1908).
74 Membership in the same church, missionary society and Sunday School
of plaintiff, defendant, and person to whom the communication was made did
not make it privileged, where no evidence appeared that such membership
imposed an obligation on members to tell each other of the faults of other

members. Ballew v. Thompson, 259 S. W. 856 (Mo. App., 1924).
75 107 Mo. App. 265, 80 S. W. 730 (1904).
76222 Mass. 464, 111 N. E. 358 (1916).
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municant without comment. However, there was no recovery allowed.
A statement published in a church paper intended for
circulation among members of the denomination alone
has been held non-libelous.77 However, the publisher must
be a member of the church ;78 but if the charges are
written to the church by a non-member for the purpose
of causing that body to try the offense, this is privileged,
it is held, on the 7 same principle that governs charges in
courts of justice.

1

COMMON INTEREST IN SUBJECT MATTER

The fourth subdivision most closely illustrates the
general application of the definition before mentioneda bona fide communication upon any subject matter
wherein the communicant has an interest or duty, made
to one with a corresponding interest or duty. The field
is a large one, even after the situations already referred
to in this discussion are excluded. It may be roughly
subdivided into public, quasi-public, and private subject
matter. The discussion here is further limited by omitting reference to business and fiduciary interests, reports of mercantile agencies, and communications to the
authorities concerning the commission of a crime.
The old English case of Harrison v. Bush,s0 is illustrative of the cases involving public interest. Here, the
plaintiff, Dr. Harrison, was a justice of the peace for
the county of Somerset and interested in politics. During
an election for a member to represent the borough of
Frome, rioting and window-breaking occurred. After the
election, the defendant, a voter and resident of the borough, in company with several hundred others, sent a
petition to Viscount Palmerston, the Secretary of State,
complaining of the plaintiff's conduct, that he had made
riotous speeches and incited breach of the peace, that
77 Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900) ; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51
Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879).
78 Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293, 39 Am. Rep. 454 (1881).
79 Remington v. Congdon, 2 Pick. (19 Mass.) 310, 13 Am. Dec. 431 (1824).
80 5 E. & B. 344, 25 L. J. Q. B. 25 (1855).
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"he had sent a man into the streets armed with a
bludgeon, and ordered him to strike any person he might
meet, indiscriminately; and that he had himself violently
struck and kicked several men and women"; and recommended his dismissal. The jury found that the defendant
acted bona fide and found in his favor.
The right, generally, to present petitions for the redress of grievances has been long acknowledged, 8 1 and
is recognized in the constitutional bills of rights. The doctrine is based, partly at least, on the ancient right of
subjects to petition the English King or Parliament."
This general doctrine necessarily includes petitions as
to misconduct, removal, or appointment of officials. 3s
Communications made at a town meeting are similarly
privileged. Thus, where, at such a meeting, having under
consideration an application from the assessors of the
town for reimbursement for expenses incurred in defending a suit, on the ground that it was brought against
them for acts done in their official capacity, a bona fide
statement by a voter and taxpayer that they had perjured themselves was held privileged.8 4
Illustrating another phase of public subject matter, in
85 defamatory
Andrews v. Gardiner,
charges at a hearing
on an application for a pardon from a conviction for
abortion, against the attorney for a medical society who had helped the prosecution, were held to be
a conditional privilege of counsel. Since this was not
strictly a judicial proceeding, it could not be an absolute
privilege.
81 McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 431 (1889);
McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S. W. 930 (1915).
82 Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S. W. 123 (1909); Harris v.
Huntingdon, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 129, 4 Am. Dec. 728 (1802).
83 White v. Nicholls, 44 U. S. 266, 11 L. Ed. 591 (1845) ; Farr v. Valentine,
38 App. Cas. (D. C.) 413, Ann. Cas. 1913C 821 and note; Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 319, 34 Am. Dec. 238 (1839). See Snively v. Record
Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921), for the unique doctrine that
a newspaper publisher has a moral obligation to tell what he knows about the
personal character of a public official.
84 Smith v. Higgins, 82 Mass. 251 (1860).
See also Young v. Richardson,
4 Ill. App. 364 (1879).
85224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918).
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Statements concerning school teachers and school affairs, while not strictly based on public subject matter,
find justification in an enlightened public policy to maintain the standard of schools by subjecting them to parental criticism.8 6 Even a letter sent to a superintendent
of schools by a pupil's father has been held to be privileged where its contents included charges of impropriety
by another pupil on the school grounds during school or
recess hours.8 7 In Thompson v. Bridges8 the privilege
was extended to accusations made at a meeting of a
parent-teachers' association against the morality of a
public school principal and his conduct with girls of the
school. However, while a county superintendent of
schools was permitted to advise the school board why
he revoked a teacher's certificate, he was not justified
in telling his reasons to persons assembled at a public
meeting. 9 And a further restriction is found in Wertz v.
Lawrence,9 0 where the father of children who had been
punished by the teacher, stated to a man and his wife,
who had a child in the school, that the teacher was insane. Here, the obvious far fetched nature of the remark,
and its implied malice, destroyed the privilege. Illinois,
in Barth v. Hanna,91 held that upon a defense of privilege
the defendant was required to show affirmatively that
he spoke from a sense of duty and with an honest belief
in the truth of the statement. The case recognized that
opprobrious statements concerning teachers are action92
able per se, as injurious to them in their profession.
Turning to private educational institutions, one finds
the same principle in operation. The defense was rec86 Malone v. Carrico, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 155 (1894); Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick.
(20 Mass.) 379, 15 Am. Dec. 228 (1825); Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278,
68 A. 566 (1908); Hoover v. Jordan, 27 Colo. App. 515, 150 P. 333 (1915);
Harwood v. Keech, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 389 (1875); Decker v. Gaylord, 35 Hun
(N. Y.) 584 (1885).
S7'Hansen v. Hansen, 126 Minn. 426, 148 N. W. 457 (1914).
88209 Ky. 710, 273 S. W. 529 (1925).
89 Rausch v. Anderson, 75 Ill. App. 526 (1897).
9066 Colo. 55, 179 P. 813 (1919).
91158 111. App. 20 (1910).
92 See also Spears v. McCoy, 155 Ky. 1, 159 S. W. 610 (1913).
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ognized in Baskett v. Crossfield,98 where a college president, in reply to inquiries of the father of a student as
to why his son had been expelled, answered that the
student had been indecently exposing his person through
the window of his dormitory, that complaints had been
made and the charges confirmed by investigation of the
faculty. The privilege may also be sustained as being
in answer to a parent's request for information concerning his child, as heretofore discussed. The privilege was
allowed on the same ground of common interest in Clark
v. McBaine94 in a dispute between faculty members of a
university. The plaintiff, a teacher and law writer, had
been dismissed after some discord between him and the
president of the university. In reply to the plaintiff's
publication in a newspaper of his version of the controversy, the defendants, members of the law faculty,
wrote and signed a letter stating that the plaintiff's dismissal was based on good grounds, that his usefulness
as a member of the faculty had ceased, and that in their
opinion he was unfit to continue his association with the
law school.
Obligations to the public owed by college research
bureaus inspire another recognition of the privilege.
Thus, where trustees of a college of pharmacy, in the
exercise of a moral duty owed to the public, investigated
the illicit importation of spurious and adulterated drugs
and reported to the Secretary of the Treasury that an
inspector under his jurisdiction had passed such articles, there was no liability.9 5 Such a holding empowers,
within limits, the current publication of the findings of
"consumers' research leagues" and "better business
associations."
Charitable reports form another category of privilege
in a quasi-public subject matter. Thus, in Waller v.
Loch,9 6 a leading English decision, the defendant was
secretary of the Charity Organization Society, one of
03 190 Ky. 751, 228 S. W. 673 (1921).
94 299 Mo. 77, 252 S. W. 428 (1923).

95 Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190 (1858).
967 Q. B. D. 619 (1881).
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the objects of which was to improve the condition of the
poor "by securing due investigation and fitting action in
all cases and by repressing mendacity." The inhabitants
of each district were invited to refer to the committee
all cases of applicants for charitable relief requiring
investigation. The plaintiff was a daughter of a deceased
officer and in distressed circumstances. A lady, desiring
to help her, obtained promises of contributions to a considerable amount. Another lady interested in the case
asked the defendant for information and received an
unfavorable report, which, with the society's permission,
she transmitted to the benefactress, who withdrew her
aid. The English court held the communication by the
society privileged, relying upon the character of the defendant's employment in a work fraught with a public
interest to excuse him.
Communications relative to a common business interest, although not required as the exercise of a bona fide
business obligation, may nevertheless be excused on more
general grounds, impinging upon a moral duty arising
from a common subject matter. Broughton v. McGrew"
is a case of this type. Here, a stockholder in a railroad
company made statements before a stockholders' meeting and in the presence of attorneys of the company, not
stockholders, attributing drunkenness and incapacity to
one of the officials. Since the right to dismiss an
official was vested in the board of directors, the defendant was clearly not subserving a strictly business interest. However, upon proof that the statements were made
in good faith, the defendant was excused from liability,
the court holding further that the presence of the nonstockholders did not destroy the privilege, in the absence
of a showing that the communication was made directly
to them."8
Along the same general line, Diddle v. Hodges9 9 determined words spoken to a landlord in answer to inquiries
97 39 F. 672, 5 L. R. A. 406 (1889).
98 Accord, as to presence of reporters: Pittard v. Oliver, 1 Q. B. 474, 70
L. J. Q. B. 219 (C. A. 1891).
992 Bosworth (15 N. Y. Super.) 537 (1858).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

by him as to the character of a tenant to be privileged.
Professional opinions are necessarily privileged, 10 0 but
here also there is room for the consideration of moral
responsibility. As an example, Cameron v. Cockran'0 '
held privileged the statement made in good faith by a
physician to his patient that the druggist who filled the
prescription had made a mistake, and that such druggist
did not understand his business. But Perkins v.
Mitchell 0 2 places a curb upon a physician's professional
opinion in holding that his statement that a patient was
fit for a lunatic asylum was libelous when made to one to
whom it was not his duty to make it.
CONCLUSION

Under any of the foregoing circumstances, as existing
in each of the four typical subdivisions considered, there
are certain essentials making up the prima facie defense
common to all groups:
1. The absence of malice, express or implied.
2. The defamatory character of the communication.
3. The existence of a relationship, whether blood, employment, social-religious, or common interest between
the parties.
4. The requirement of a preceding request by the person defamed or the party having the relationship, where
no relationship exists between the publisher and the
addressee.
These indispensable elements, recognized by modern
legal decisions, both in this country and in England, have
remained firm through the years, and decisions developed when the doctrine was in embryo are cited and
approved today.

100 Attorney-client: Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N. J. L. 378, 79 A. 316 (1910);
Mack v. Sharp, 138 Mich. 448, 101 N. W. 631 (1904). Physician-patient: Brice
v. Curtis, 38 App. Cas. (D. C.) 304, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 69 and note (1912),
(even in presence of sister at patient's request).
1012 Mary. (16 Del.) 166, 42 A. 454 (1895). See also Cash Drug Store v.
Cannon, 47 S. W. (2d) 861 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932).
10231 Barb. (N. Y.) 461 (1860).

